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I. INTRODUCTION
When many of us think about fair housing enforcement,
scenes involving undercover apartment applicants ferreting out
racially biased landlords come to mind. Indeed, fair housing "test-
ers" have been and continue to be an important element of civil
rights accountability.' However, implementation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968 has had at least as much to do with increasing the
supply of decent, affordable housing options to members of pro-
tected groups as with assuring those individuals that they will not
be denied a particular housing unit because of the color of their
skin or a disability.2
* Clinical Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I would like to
thank the participants in the Symposium, particularly my fellow presenters, for
their engaging questions and feedback. I am especially grateful to the editors of
this symposium issue and my colleagues, Kermit Lind, Joe Schilling, Danny
Schaffzin, and Steve Barlow, for all their work in organizing this wonderful
discussion of these vitally important issues.
1. Michael J. Yelnosky, What Does "Testing" Tell us About the Inci-
dence of Discrimination in Housing Markets?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1488,
1492 (1999); see also Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Fair Housing
Testing-Uncovering Discriminatory Practices, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1127,
1132-34 (1995).
2. The Fair Housing Act bans housing discrimination on any one of six
bases: "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
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This macro aspect of fair housing enforcement has been led
by organized activists challenging the policies, actions, and inac-
tions of state and local housing and land use agencies. Early on, it
involved battles over the siting of public housing projects outside
areas of concentrated poverty, like the 1980's-era struggle in Yon-
kers depicted in the recent critically acclaimed HBO series, Show
Me a Hero.3 As housing subsidy increasingly took the form of rent
payment vouchers, advocates litigated to force local agencies to
facilitate the voluntary relocation of poor, inner-city residents of
color to suburban areas that had good schools as well as jobs.4
Critical to plaintiffs' prospects for success in these impact
cases has been the ability to establish a violation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act through evidence that showed that the policies in question
disproportionately harmed the housing opportunities of federally
protected racial groups. Proving racial bias as the motivation be-
hind the adoption of a harmful governmental policy has been even
more difficult than it has been in the reason for denial of an apart-
ment or mortgage application. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that a showing of deliberate discrimination is required to establish
a violation of constitutional rights under the Equal Protection
Clause, but the lower court, upon remand, held that the Fair Hous-
ing Act was not so limited in its protection.5 Evidence that a fa-
cially neutral policy nevertheless harmed the housing prospects of
a protected group would at least shift the burden of proof to the
defendant governmental unit to justify the policy approach.6 Ad-
vocates battling against the exclusion of affordable housing have
had some success in showing that targeted policies harm the hous-
§ 3604(a) (2012). Racial minorities and the disabled, however, face the most
compromised housing options because they, to a greater extent than religious
minorities, face significant economic marginalization, which causes them to be
harmed by shortages of affordable housing. See The Fair Housing Act, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fair-housing-act-1 ("The number
of cases filed since 1968 alleging religious discrimination is small in comparison
to some of the other prohibited bases, such as race or national origin.") (last
visited April 4, 2016).
3. Show Me a Hero (HBO 2015).
4. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Thompson v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d. 398 (D. Md. 2005).
5. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71
(1977), remanded to 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
6. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1294-95.
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ing options of racial minorities.7 But, local jurisdictions' ability to
escape liability by showing a non-racial basis for a detrimental
policy has contributed to a declining overall success rate in federal
appellate courts. Such a record has encouraged activists to look
elsewhere in the law to advance housing justice for protected
groups.9
Potentially more important than the ability to prove unlaw-
ful discrimination through disparate impact evidence is the capaci-
ty to scrutinize a local agency's compliance with its Fair Housing
Act obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing ("AFFH").10
Offered as a possible "missing link" in the chain of fair housing
accountability," AFFH has significant potential to affect local de-
cision-making. By law, recipients of funding from the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
not only have to avoid policies that deny protected groups housing
opportunities, they also are required to work proactively to elimi-
nate entrenched segregation in their communities regardless of
who is to blame for its creation.12
7. This success with prima facie cases against exclusionary policies is
particularly notable when compared with the struggle to challenge revitalization
efforts. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 357, 399-402 (2013).
8. Id. at 388-89.
9. Advocates have sought state law remedies against exclusionary zon-
ing in the courts. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 713 (1975). Advocates have also sought these remedies in the legislature
through the enactment of inclusionary housing land use measures. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-30 (West 2012).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012) ("The Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development shall ... administer the programs and activities relating to housing
and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this
title . . . ."); 24 C.F.R. § 5.150-5.180 (2015) (establishing regulations which
further the policy of affirmatively furthering fair housing).
11. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO
L. REv. 967, 1006 (2012), reprinted in 23 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMTY.
DEV. L 149, 188 (2015).
12. The AFFH duty applies to all barriers to the housing opportunities of
protected groups, but those impediments to fair housing brought about by a local
jurisdiction's policies may be entitled to a priority response under its AFFH
strategy. See infra text accompanying note 65.
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In 2009, the new leadership at HUD began a process of de-
veloping regulations for the AFFH duty. Those efforts came to
fruition in July 2015 with the publication of the Final Rule for
AFFH.1 3 In this Article, I will examine how the new AFFH rule
impacts local government efforts to confront the epidemic of va-
cant houses in America's older cities. Market-sensitive responses
to vacant properties drive many of the best practices in code en-
forcement and land banking.14 Reconnecting marginalized areas to
functioning real estate markets promotes neighborhood choice not
only because remaining in the communities they have called home
should be a viable option for residents of color but also because the
ability of local government to provide essential services requires
the elimination of vacant property nuisances. Yet, the short-term
effects of these strategies and their similarities to previous publicly
sanctioned instances of government redlining raise profound ques-
tions of racial and social equity.'5 The first Part of this Article will
examine both the unique role of AFFH within the Fair Housing
Act and its articulation in the recently released Final Rule. The
next Part will articulate how local governments required by the
Final Rule to submit Assessments of Fair Housing ("AFHs") to
HUD should structure and discuss innovative, market-based ap-
proaches to their vacant property challenges.
13. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272-42,371
(July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, & 903).
14. Understanding the availability of capital investment for renovations is
vital to a municipality's strategic planning for vacant property nuisance respons-
es. James J. Kelly, Jr., A Continuum In Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Prop-
erties to the Market, 23 ST. L. U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 117-20 (2013). Mapping
neighborhoods for the strength of their housing markets can "make it possible
not only to design cost-effective strategies for revitalization but also to adjust
them to reflect changes in market conditions." ALAN MALLACH, BRINGING
BUILDINGS BACK: FROM ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO COMMUNITY ASSETS 23.
For an explanation of how data can inform vacant property strategies, see Ira
Goldstein, Using the Market Value Analysis to Analyze Markets, Set Strategy
and Evaluate Change, THE REINVESTMENT FUND (2013),
http://www.trfund.com/using-the-market-value-analysis-to-analyze-markets-set-
strategy-and-evaluate-change.
15. JAMES J. KELLY, JR., JUST, SMART: CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AND
MARKET-SENSITIVE VACANT PROPERTY STRATEGIES 2 (2014), reprinted in 23 J.
AFFORDABLE HoUs. & CMTY. DEV. L. 209, 210-11 (2015).
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Market-sensitive vacant property strategies affirmatively
further fair housing as long as they are not implemented in a way
that runs afoul of the Fair Housing Act's prohibitions and provided
that they look to the potential unintended consequences of
strengthening real estate markets in marginalized neighborhoods.16
Furthermore, framing vacant property strategies as an AFFH ap-
proach may have benefits for vacant property reforms, especially
those connected with acquisition of vacant properties by land
banks. Because the AFFH framework sees the problem of housing
justice for statutorily protected groups as a regional one, municipal
jurisdictions in need of cooperation from county governments in
order to achieve their land banking goals may be able to use the
AFFH requirement as leverage.
II. AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING
The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, family composition, disability, or national
origin in the marketing and management of residential real estate.'7
Specifically it prohibits motivated rejection or steering of a pro-
spective tenant or homebuyer, discriminatory advertising, and
blockbusting. These prohibitions directly address many of the
tactics that individual private actors employed to perpetuate resi-
dential segregation of various kinds but especially that of race.
But, the Fair Housing Act also provides mechanisms for eliminat-
ing systemic barriers to neighborhood integration.
The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to "otherwise
make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of
race."19 Civil rights groups, affordable housing activists, and anti-
poverty advocates have used the "otherwise make unavailable"
16. Paul C. Brophy & Jennifer S. Vey, Seizing City Assets: Ten Steps to
Urban Land Reform, THE BROOKINGS INST. CEOs FOR CITIES RES. BRIEF 18
(Oct. 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2002/10/
metropolitanpolicy-brophy/brophyveyvacantsteps.pdf ("Step 9: Be Sensitive to
Gentrification and Relocation Issues").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605. The FHA also makes it illegal to hinder
those who support protected persons in securing their fair housing rights. 42
U.S.C. § 3617.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
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language to confront various housing assistance,20 community de-
velopment and zoning22 policies, and decisions of state and local
governments. As with the provisions holding parties in real estate
deals accountable, the broader prohibition on discriminatory poli-
cies can be proven with a showing that the banned action was mo-
tivated by bias. However, if proof of racist or other discriminatory
intent can be difficult to uncover when someone's apartment appli-
cation is denied, it is all but impossible to find evidence of similar
intent behind the enactment of a policy that prevents the construc-
tion of the entire apartment building.
In seeking to invalidate a policy under the Fair Housing
Act, advocates have offered, and courts have considered, statistical
evidence of the policy's disproportionate adverse impact on a pro-
tected group's access to housing.23 Because the actions of both
governments and private institutions can be motivated by a wide
range of goals and have an even greater number of effects, courts
have allowed defendant policymakers to respond to showings of
disparate impact by presenting evidence of legitimate, neutral poli-
cy objectives that cannot be attained, easily or, sometimes, at all,
without the cited adverse impacts.2 4  The approach of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sometimes labeled "im-
pact plus," incorporates elements of both effect and intention.2 5 In
20. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F. 2d 306 (7th Cir.
1970).
21. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F. 2d 1261 (3rd Cir.
1977).
22. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
23. 100 A.L.R. Fed. 97, § 2(a).
24. Bradley v. U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., 658 F.2d 290, 295 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("If the court ruled, as the plaintiffs would have us, that the transfer
of funds to redevelopment planning was illegal because it did not benefit per-
sons of low and moderate income as much as would rehabilitation of the area's
stock housing, we would be usurping the legislature's role in determining com-
munity needs and establishing priorities.").
25. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290 ("We therefore hold that
at least under some circumstances a violation of section 3604(a) can be estab-
lished by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminato-
ry intent.... [W]e agree that a showing of discriminatory intent is not required
under section 3604(a), we refuse to conclude that every action which products
discriminatory effects is illegal.").
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examining the rejection of a petition to rezone a parcel for the de-
velopment of affordable multifamily housing, the Seventh Circuit
found that the plaintiffs' evidence should be judged by weighing
the following factors: (1) the presentation of strong evidence for
discriminatory effect; (2) the existence of some evidence for dis-
criminatory intent; (3) the lack of a substantial nondiscriminatory
basis for the defendant's action; and (4) a showing that the defend-
ant is interfering with, rather than merely failing to produce, hous-
ing opportunities for protected persons of color.26
As influential as this and other, similar disparate impact
tests have been in the federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not rule on the sufficiency of disparate impact evidence until its 5-
4 decision last year in Texas Department of Housing & Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.27 In an opinion au-
thored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the majority upheld the dis-
parate impact test but emphasized the burden plaintiffs bore to
show a strong causal connection between the challenged policy
and the adverse effects on protected groups.2 8 The Court also cau-
tioned lower courts not to disregard defendants' justifications for
policy decisions if they are not shown to be "artificial, arbitrary
and unnecessary barriers.,2 9 Even as the courts have solidified the
Fair Housing Act as a tool against unlawful practices and policies,
another FHA mechanism for dismantling segregation and promot-
ing meaningful residential choice is only now coming into its own
nearly half a century after its enactment.
Even with the ability to challenge harmful policies by
demonstrating causation if not intent, civil right advocates struggle
against an overwhelming array of state and local government deci-
sions that contribute to the isolation of poor people of color. Many
of these decisions will never be successfully invalidated in federal
court. Complainants can produce a compelling account of the des-
peration that racial minorities and the disabled face in their search
for decent, affordable housing. They may go further and show
how various exclusionary zoning practices aggravate that hardship.
26. Id. at 1290-93.
27. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
28. Id. at 2523.
29. Id. at 2522 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
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But, once the defendant local government articulates an otherwise
neutral-that is, nondiscriminatory-basis for the policies, the
burden remains on the plaintiff to show how that objective can be
achieved, at little or no additional cost, without the adverse impact
on any protected group.30  Striking down practices and policies,
while effective in some cases,3 1 fails to hold local and state agen-
cies accountable for the persistence of deeply-rooted racial segre-
gation spanning decades and generations.
The Fair Housing Act charges HUD not only to enforce its
prohibitions but to "affirmatively further" its stated goals of ending
segregation in housing and increasing meaningful housing choice
for members of protected groups.32 The principal method by
which HUD has affirmatively furthered fair housing is to extend
that obligation to the hundreds of states, participating jurisdictions,
and public housing authorities that receive HUD funding. The le-
gal obligations of many state and local agencies do not end, then,
with mere compliance with FHA's primary prohibitions against
interfering with the housing and neighborhood choices of protected
group members. On the contrary, these municipal and county ac-
tors appear to have an unbounded mandate to break down barriers
to racial integration, no matter their role in creating or sustaining
those barriers. Given the broad array of governmental actions that
could be taken to bring about more housing choice for marginal-
ized racial minorities and disabled persons, it is not completely
surprising to read that some conservative commentators have
greeted the Obama administration efforts to more effectively im-
plement the AFFH duty with alarm bordering on panic.
In a 2015 National Review article entitled "Attention
America's Suburbs: You Have Just Been Annexed," Stanley Kurtz
professes amazement a the lack of media attention to the "breath-
taking radicalism" embodied by HUD efforts to enforce Affirma-
30. Id. at 2515.
31. In 2006, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Center sued St. Ber-
nard Parish over its zoning ordinance prohibiting property owners, 93% of
whom were white, from renting to anyone not related to them by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption and forced the county government to repeal the blatantly rac-
ist law. Time Runs Out for St. Bernard Parish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30wed3.html.
32. 42 U.S.C §§ 3601-3619 (2012).
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tively Furthering Fair Housing.33 Kurtz claims the Federal gov-
ernment will confront wealthy suburban governments with the
facts of regional housing inequality and then they would be "obli-
gated to nullify their zoning ordinances and build high-density,
low-income housing at their own expense."34 Comparing the obli-
gations that these local governments have under the "otherwise
make unavailable" prohibition and AFFH, it seems plausible that
the latter may be the missing piece for federal efforts to strike
down barriers to housing choice for protected groups. But, neither
the elation nor the panic is justified. The Fair Housing Act does
not empower HUD to mandate the spending priorities of state and
local governments or to force its funding recipients to abandon
their duly adopted policies or laws, even if they clearly run counter
to a mission of affirmatively furthering fair housing. Instead, fed-
eral law explicitly prohibits HUD from conditioning its funding on
the abolition of any state or local government law, policy, or prac-
tice that does not itself violate federal law.3 5
AFFH is not a wholesale Congressional revision of local
land use law, however crucial that might be to ending patterns of
residential discrimination in certain parts of the country. Instead,
AFFH creates the basis for a discussion between HUD and its re-
cipients about what those recipients are doing "to overcome histor-
ic patterns of segregation, promote fair housing choice, and foster
inclusive communities that are free from discrimination."3 6 Erm
cannot require a suburban county government to repeal its exclu-
sionary zoning practices as a condition of continued funding.
HUD can, however, insist that it acknowledge that such duly
adopted laws create barriers to affordable housing, the lack of
which disproportionately harms racial minorities and perpetuates
33. Stanley Kurtz, Attention America's Suburbs: You Have Just Been




35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12711 (West 2015). A jurisdiction that has violated
the law may negotiate a settlement of the related charges that may include its
commitment to make specific changes in its laws and/or fund, at its own ex-
pense, the development of affordable housing, but that is a mutually acceptable
form of punishment.
36. 24 CFR § 5.150 (2015).
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racial segregation.37 Moreover, HUD can insist that the same local
government explain how its priorities and goals are designed to
"overcome the effects" of those contributing factors and related
fair housing issues.3 8
Under the system of fair housing reporting that existed pri-
or to the adoption of the Final Rule on AFFH last year, state and
local jurisdictions, as well as public housing authorities, that re-
ceived Community Planning and Development Formula Grant
Program fundS39 were required to submit an annual certification
that each had prepared an Analysis of Impediments ("Als") to the
achievement of fair housing in its program or jurisdiction.40 Each
was also required to articulate steps taken to overcome those im-
pediments and document information related to the impediments
and/or the remedial actions.41 A 2010 study of Als by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, however, found that many of them
were outdated or lacked plans for responding to fair housing barri-
ers.42 The same report criticized HUD's own efforts to promote
AFFH pointing out that funding recipients lacked guidance as to
the content and format of Als and that funding recipients had little
reason to fear enforcement actions by HUD related to AFFH.43
With the issuance of the Final Rule in July 2015,44 HUD
has responded to each of these problems. Instead of certifying the
existence of a fair housing analysis, recipients of HUD funds will
now be required to submit an Assessment of Fair Housing to HUD
37. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
38. Westchester v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 802 F.3d 413, 434
(2nd Cir. 2015) (citing 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2015)).
39. 24 C.F.R. § 5.162(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2015).
40. Timothy M. Smyth, Michael Allen & Marisa Schaith, The Fair Hous-
ing Act: The Evolving Landscape for Federal Grant Recipients and Sub-
Recipients, 23 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 231, 235
(2015).
41. Id. at 236.
42. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
GRANTS: HUD NEEDS OT ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF
JURISDICTIONS' FAIR HOUSING PLANS 1 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO- 10-905.
43. Id. at 1-2.
44. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272-01 (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
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for review and acceptance.4 5 By creating this new reporting ap-
proach to fair housing, HUD is setting the stage for a broader and
more consistent enforcement of the duty to Affirmatively Further
Fair Housing. The Final Rule takes an expansive approach to the
subject matter and geography of fair housing. While some com-
menters objected during the rulemaking process that HUD's new
reporting system would require analysis of governmental functions
not funded by HUD or even controlled by state and local agencies
funded by HUD,46 HUD insisted that a thorough analysis of barri-
ers to fair housing had to include all of the factors affecting the
availability of housing opportunities for statutorily protected
groups.4 7 Nothing in the statute or in the case law restricts the dis-
cussion of AFFH compliance to those areas of state and local gov-
ernment function that are administered by housing and community
development agencies. If local tax policies within the control of
local jurisdictions have an impact on fair housing in a metropolitan
area, then the reporting grant recipient cannot merely disclaim any
responsibility just because control of those functions have been
assigned to the finance department. The housing and community
development agency is reporting on behalf of the entire city or
county and must articulate how that unit of government is comply-
ing with AFFH.4 8
Similarly, analysis of barriers to housing opportunities can-
not be compartmentalized within a single set of municipal or coun-
ty boundaries. Housing markets are metropolitan in their overall
scope and the analysis of fair housing barriers must be regional as
well.49 Here, however, the AFFH duty does not become a collec-
tive duty. Each participating jurisdiction has its own AFFH duty.
But, the Final Rule encourages reporting fund recipients to collab-
orate with other participating jurisdictions in the same metropolitan
area to produce reports that systematically analyze segregation in
the area and offer collaborative integration strategies.5 0
45. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154 (2015).
46. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,278,
42,281, 42,284-85.
47. Id. at 42,282, 42,285.
48. Id. at 42,285.
49. Id. at 42,286.
50. 24 C.F.R. § 5.156 (2015).
1019
The University of Memphis Law Review
The Final Rule also combats compartmentalization in the
understanding of fair housing objectives. The quality of housing
opportunities for racial minorities and the disabled is not judged
exclusively by the physical condition and suitability of the housing
unit itself. An analysis of housing availability must also look to
the neighborhood environments associated with the possible resi-
dential options. Certainly, the level of crime, especially burglaries
and home invasions, is relevant to evaluating the adequacy of a
housing opportunity. But, AFFH is not limited to those aspects of
life associated with actual physical presence in the home.
Appropriate housing type and physical quality of structure
are important, but, increasingly, residence location is key to a vari-
ety of developmentally essential public goods. Frequently, a fami-
ly's access to strong primary and secondary schools is determined
by where that family lives. For people of limited means, public
transportation may be essential to connecting with good jobs
and/or training and education resources. Even access to quality
food, health, and recreation resources are often dependent on the
neighborhood one lives in. Even as racial segregation has moder-
ated over the last three decades, isolation of poor households has
intensified.5' The result is that the typical poor African-American
or Hispanic family was more likely to live in area with high con-
centration of poverty in 1990 than it was twenty years earlier.52
Thus, HUD's AFH process requires analysis of and strategies re-
sponsive to "significant disparities in access to opportunity."5 3
The redesign of the reporting process provides for clearer
accountability by making submission to and acceptance by HUD a
prerequisite of continued funding. But, the process also requires
that reporting entities listen to their citizens and base their analysis
on the quantitative indicators most relevant to an assessment of fair
housing in a particular geographic area. HUD has taken it upon
itself to provide this "data related to education, poverty, transit
access, employment, exposure to environmental health hazards,
51. Douglas S. Massey, Jonathan Rothwell, & Thurston Domina, The
Changing Bases of Segregation in the United States, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 74, 77, 82 (2009).
52. PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS AND
THE AMERICAN CITY 40 (1996).
53. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(2)(iii) (2015).
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and other critical community assets, as well as nationally uniform
local and regional data on patterns of integration and segregation;
racial and ethnic concentrations of poverty; disproportionate hous-
ing needs based on protected class; and outstanding discrimination
findings." 54  HUD's communication of the data is not itself a
judgment by HUD as to the severity of segregation and housing
inequality in the region. On the other hand, the fact that the Fair
Housing Act has been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to embrace
disparate impact arguments clears the way for HUD to make a
strong connection between affordable housing availability and fair
housing goals.5 5
Enforcement of AFFH would have been significantly lim-
ited if the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities had ruled that
the Fair Housing Act itself and/or the 5th Amendment's guarantee
of equal protection excluded consideration of disparate impact
showings in adjudicating Fair Housing Act violations.56 Although
the immediate consequence of such a ruling would have been to
protect all policies that could not be shown to be the products of
deliberate discrimination, the argument could have then been made
that the only kind of segregation that could be the legitimate con-
cern of AFFH was segregation that was deliberately created. If so,
then even clear statistical demonstration of the lack of affordability
in opportunity areas and the lack of opportunity in areas with plen-
ty of low-cost housing would not be enough to put local govern-
ments to the question as how they would respond as required by
AFFH. As it is, the high court's confirmation of disparate impact
allows HUD to supply data that raises compelling AFFH questions
simply by showing the spatial mismatch of affordable housing and
important community goods. Doing so requires that HUD's evi-
54. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,710, 43,731
(July 19, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
55. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the "ro-
bust causality" required by Inclusive Cmtys. Project, see William J. Callison,
Inclusive Communities: Geographic Desegregation, Urban Revitalization, And
Disparate Impact Under The Fair Housing Act, 46 U. MEM. L. REv. 1039,
1048-50 (2016).
56. HUD cited the Supreme Court ruling in response to comments about
the use of disparate impact theories in the articulation of the Final Rule. 80 Fed.
Reg. 42,272-01, 42,283 (citing Texas Dept' of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclu-
sive Cmtys. Project, 132 S. Ct. 2507, 2525-26 (2015)).
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dence shows that certain protected groups, usually the disabled as
well as economically disadvantaged racial minorities, are dispro-
portionately harmed by the lack of affordable housing in desirable
neighborhoods. The data provided by HUD is not the only source
of information to which reporting jurisdictions must respond.
The AFH process also facilitates citizen participation by
requiring participating jurisdictions to seek input from those wish-
ing to address local fair housing issues.57 Community groups will
confront reporting jurisdictions with accusations of deliberate dis-
crimination and challenge the justifications of policies that dispro-
portionately harm protected groups. They, along with civil rights
and affordable housing advocates, will offer their own views on
what are the most important fair housing issues and the best ways
to address them. As seen from the Final Rule's description of the
AFH report's structure, local governments must be prepared not
only to relate these messages on to HUD, but also to state whether
or not they agree and why.
The Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing pro-
vides the following breakdown of the Assessment of Fair Hous-
ing Report:
(1) Analysis: Identification of integration and seg-
regation patterns, racially or ethnically concentrated
areas of poverty, significant disparities in access to
community assets for all protected classes, and dis-
parities in access to housing for all protected clas-
ses.
(2) Fair Housing Priorities and Goals: A prioritized
list of fair housing issues, a list of the most signifi-
cant factors in shaping the fair housing situation,
and goals for addressing them.
(3) Community Input: Process for and content of
community input as well as the reporting jurisdic-
tion's responses.
57. 24 C.F.R. § 5.158(a) (2015).
58. Id. § 5.154.
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After it has been submitted, HUD has sixty days to reject
the AFH report.59 Obviously, if the report' s summary of commu-
nity input reveals substantiated allegations that the reporting juris-
diction deliberately discriminates against protected groups or "oth-
erwise . .. make[s] unavailable"60 their housing options, HUD can
reject the report and require any future funding be contingent on
compliance with the basic obligations of the Fair Housing Act.6 1
Likewise, an AFH report will be required to relay information
from civil rights advocates that the reporting entity's policies rein-
force or aggravate segregation by preventing the creation of af-
fordable housing in desirable neighborhoods or by frustrating revi-
talization efforts. The legitimate land use or fiscal objectives be-
hind these policies may prevent them from being invalidated under
the Fair Housing Act.62 But, the question remains as to whether or
not the duty to AFFH is not somehow increased by a reporting ju-
risdiction's policies being shown to be a contributing factor to the
reinforcement of segregation. An argument could be made that, in
prioritizing the contributing factors to segregation, a reporting ju-
risdiction has an obligation to elevate the harms it has caused
through its own policies.63 The AFH would also then name among
its top goals responses to these contributing factors. Following this
logic through the integrated reporting process, the consolidated
plan of that jurisdiction would articulate strategies and actions that
give special attention to remedying those negative effects caused
by the jurisdiction's own actions.
More than anything, the AFH should explain how a report-
ing jurisdiction is overcoming any spatial mismatch between op-
portunity and affordable housing. HUD was challenged on its fo-
59. Id. § 5.162.
60. 42 U.S.C. §3604 (2012).
61. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 6-8, 25-31 and accompanying text.
63. The Supreme Court has recognized the relevance of a local history of
de jure segregation to the imposition of desegregation remedies by federal courts
and the adoption of affirmative action mechanisms where such responses would
be problematic legally in the absence of past deliberate discrimination. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745-47 (1974); Parents Involved v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 721 (2007) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467,494 (1992)).
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cus on concentration of poverty with the argument that "[p]overty
is not a protected class."64 In response, HUD stated:
it is entirely consistent with the Fair Housing Act's
duty to affirmatively further fair housing to coun-
teract past policies and decisions that account for
today's racially or ethnically concentrated areas of
poverty or housing cost burdens and housing needs
that are disproportionately high for certain groups
of persons based on characteristics protected by the
Fair Housing Act. Preparation of an AFH could be
an important step in reducing poverty among groups
of persons who share characteristics protected by
the Fair Housing Act. The focus and purpose of the
AFH is to identify, and to begin the process of
planning to overcome, the causes and contributing
factors that deny or impede housing choice and ac-
cess to opportunity based on race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, familial status, and disability.
In addition, a large body of research has consistent-
ly found that the problems associated with segrega-
tion are greatly exacerbated when combined with
concentrated poverty. That is the legal basis and
context for the examination of RCAPs/ECAPs [Ra-
cially & Ethnically Concentrated Areas of Poverty],
as required by the rule.6 5
Many of the fair housing advocates urging increased atten-
tion to the problems associated with overconcentration of poverty
have championed mobility strategies over revitalization invest-
ments to overcome the spatial mismatch between affordable hous-
ing and economic opportunity. They have fought for the develop-
ment of subsidized housing in areas that lack affordable housing
opportunities, even when such siting costs additional time and
money. Inclusive Communities, the plaintiff in the recent land-
mark Supreme Court case, has directly opposed the diversion of
64. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272-01,
42,283 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
65. Id.
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affordable housing subsidy from areas of opportunity to neighbor-
hoods that are already home to many low-income households.66
As AFFH made its way through the rulemaking process, advocates
for investment in distressed neighborhoods expressed concern that
HUD was discouraging recipients from developing affordable
housing opportunities in or near areas of concentrated poverty.
With the issuance of the Final Rule, HUD made clear that
"strategically enhancing access to opportunity include[d] . . .: Tar-
geted investment in neighborhood revitalization or stabilization;
preservation or rehabilitation of existing affordable housing" in
addition to "promoting greater housing choice within or outside of
areas of concentrated poverty and greater access to areas of high
opportunity. 67 HUD added this clarification in response to com-
ments it received about earlier versions of the rule.68 Commenters
argued that, as originally framed, the AFFH rule "appears to pro-
hibit program participants from using Federal resources in neigh-
borhoods of concentrated poverty."69 HUD responded that "[t]he
duty to affirmatively further fair housing does not dictate or pre-
clude particular investments or strategies as a matter of law....
HUD's rule recognizes the role of place-based strategies, including
economic development to improve conditions in high poverty
neighborhoods ....
HUD's commitment to recognizing both the revitalization
of dilapidated neighborhoods and the facilitation of the voluntary
relocation of the low-income households to opportunity areas is
critical for cities and counties struggling with vacant and aban-
doned properties. These communities depend greatly on the funds
they receive from HUD in the form of HOME funds, Emergency
Solutions Grants and, particularly, Community Development
Block Grants ("CDBG"). Their softer real estate markets make
housing affordability less of a concern than in higher-demand re-
gions. But, the older, post-industrial cities of the Rust Belt also
exhibit some of the most severe and intractable patterns of racial
66. See Texas Dept' of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Pro-
ject, 132 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2015).
68. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,277-
79 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
69. Id. at 42,278.
70. Id. at 42,279.
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segregation in the country. As such, these jurisdictions need to be
especially attentive to recent developments in AFFH and make
sure that their revitalization programs that depend on HUD funding
support their AFFH goals.
III. DISCUSSING MARKET-SENSITIVE VACANT PROPERTY
STRATEGIES IN ASSESSMENTS OF FAIR HOUSING AND
CONSOLIDATED PLANS
Local governments seeking to make their distressed neigh-
borhoods attractive to potential residents choosing new homes
must be able to express these revitalization goals as consonant with
the promotion of fair housing even as they contend with accusa-
tions their market-sensitive approaches to vacant properties rein-
forces segregation patterns. They must be able to respond to any
allegations from the community that their vacant property strate-
gies are deliberately discriminatory or that they disproportionately
and unjustifiably impair the housing opportunities of racial minori-
ties. Even if the market-sensitive approaches are justifiable, the
local governments still need to be attentive to any disparate impact
they may have on the access that minority households have to de-
cent, affordable housing and key community goods. Most im-
portantly, county and municipal agencies that embrace market-
sensitive approaches to code enforcement and land banking must
show how these strategies will achieve the AFFH goal of promot-
ing stable, inclusive communities.
At first it would appear that HUD's acceptance, as a legiti-
mate fair housing goal, of revitalization of concentrated areas of
poverty would end the discussion there. But, the importance of
attracting private capital to these distressed areas puts vacant prop-
erty revitalization strategies in apparent conflict with the goal of
promoting the housing prospects of low-income families of color.
In chasing households who already have housing choices, these
older cities seem to be casting aside those with limited options. A
superficial understanding of the market-sensitive approach to code
enforcement would not only disqualify the market-sensitive ap-
proach to vacant properties as an AFFH strategy but would cast
doubt on its compatibility with the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Fair Housing Act. Only a thorough exploration of the logic
that animates market-sensitive code enforcement and land banking
can illustrate its true worth as a mechanism for affirmatively fur-
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thering neighborhood choice as well as pointing out genuine areas
of concern with regard to fair housing compliance.
An appreciation of the place of vacant property revitaliza-
tion in the larger struggle for housing justice begins with an under-
standing of how vacant properties ruin neighborhoods. When left
completely unsecured and open to casual entry, vacant properties
attract criminal activity and unauthorized occupancy and pose a
significant fire danger. Both vacant houses and abandoned lots can
harbor rats and other vermin as well as pose dangers for neighbor-
hood children.71 Because abandoned houses can inflict fire and
water damage on adjacent houses, neighboring property owners
have encountered, sometimes insurmountable, difficulties in ob-
taining casualty and liability insurance for their own properties.72
The lack of such basic protection can make mortgage financing
unavailable or even cause a current mortgage loan to be declared in
default despite the owner being current on his or her monthly pay-
ments.73 Given the variety of serious spillover effects, one can
easily imagine how a lone vacant house can diminish the value of
compliant houses within a block or two by 1.5% to 3%.74
Given the severity of the impact of abandonment, local
governments would apparently be well-served to aggressively pur-
sue enforcement of any relevant code in all cases. And indeed,
addressing vacant properties has become an urgent priority for
many older cities. But, the market conditions of a neighborhood
dramatically impact the ability of code enforcement authorities to
compel the rehabilitation of dilapidated houses.
71. Brian Nordli, Boy Killed in Fire was Playing with Brother Inside
Vacant Home, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 2, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.lasvegas
sun.com/news/2013/may/02/house-fire-claims-life-las-vegas-child.
72. MARGARET BASS ET AL., VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COST TO
COMMUNITIES 11 (2005).
73. See e.g., Federal National Mortgage Association Indiana Mortgage
Form, FANNIE MAE §5, https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/security-
instruments (last visited Apr. 11, 2016); Federal National Mortgage Association
Multistate Fixed-Rate Note, FANNIE MAE § 10,
https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/notes (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
74. Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant,
Tax-Delinquent, and Foreclosed Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring
Homes 35 (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 11 -23R).
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An example will illustrate the impact of neighborhood real
estate markets. Imagine a freestanding wood-frame house with
1,500 square feet of interior space. If this house has been unoccu-
pied and neglected for more than a year or two, it may have sus-
tained significant damage to the exterior doors and windows ex-
posing its interior to the elements. At $50 per square foot, a con-
servative, full-scale attempt to bring this vacant house into full
code compliance would cost $75,000. Even properties that can be
made ready for occupancy for substantially less nearly always re-
quire more cash than a typical owner would have on hand for ordi-
nary repairs.7 5 Since elimination of a vacant house nuisance al-
ways involves a major capital investment, no sensible response
strategy can ignore the importance of the return on that investment.
Even if an owner is willing to make repair expenditures that cannot
be recaptured through increased use, income, or resale value, no
lender may be willing to provide the necessary funds. With so
much money involved, the financial feasibility of that capital in-
vestment often dictates whether or not it goes forward, the owner's
obligations under local codes notwithstanding.
Nothing limits the ability of a property to make a return on
rehabilitation investment more than the weakness of the surround-
ing real estate market. If nearby houses, even ones not impacted
directly by the abandoned property, are not selling for more than
$50,000, it is unlikely that a $75,000 investment will pay off for
the renovating owner of the vacant house. In many Rust Belt in-
ner-city neighborhoods, inhabitable homes can be purchased for
less than $25,000. But, if such properties are allowed to fall into
severe disrepair, their rehabilitation will not necessarily be achiev-
able for less than $25,000. As such, their owners may simply walk
away from them rather than throw good money after bad.
Local building codes allow authorities to impose fines and
even seek court orders against owners that fail to bring vacant
76properties into basic code compliance. But, even these powerful
75. Leila Atassi, Cleveland's Glut of Vacant Housing Could Cost Billions
to Eliminate at Current Pace, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 25, 2011, 3:02
PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/09/clevelands-glutof
vacant hous.html.
76. See e.g., INT'L BLDG. CODE § 116.1 (2012); IND. CODE §36-7-9-1
(2015).
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remedies will have limited impact on an owner that lacks the cash
to return the property to productive use. They certainly will not
induce a third party to buy the property and make a clearly bad bet
by rehabbing the house. Likewise, no court order or fines will in-
duce a bank to lend the desperate owner money on such a property,
even if it happens to be free and clear of any preexisting mortgag-
es. For those relatively few owners with the available resources to
bring the property up to code, coercion may make all the differ-
ence. Even here though, courts may be reluctant to require them to
make the property habitable if more modest means of mitigating
the nuisance effects on surrounding properties are available.
For those vacant properties, however, located in neighbor-
hoods with stronger real estate markets, the prospects are quite
different. Once renovated, a formerly vacant property should be
able to command the same rent or sale price as comparable proper-
ties on the same block. If those values are sufficient to justify the
cost of the renovation, then the question shifts from whether, when
or how the repairs are to be made to why not immediately, espe-
cially when code enforcement looms as an additional inducement.
Many times, a financially prudent renovation of a vacant house is
delayed indefinitely by an owner's unwillingness or ability to carry
out the repairs. Coercion by code enforcement remedies functions
to force such an owner to internalize the costs imposed on the
neighborhood. If the owner is incapable of bringing about the re-
pairs, then a voluntary sale may be the best solution. If the own-
er's obstinacy, total absence, or title problems with the property
limit the prospects of market transfer, then a more innovative code
enforcement procedure may be needed.
In the early 1990's, the City of Baltimore amended its
Building Code to create a special proceeding that authorized a
court to appoint a receiver for an unoccupied residential property
with serious, long-standing code violations.7 7 Like receivership
remedies for occupied multifamily buildings that had been enacted
in large cities, this vacant house receivership proceeding author-
ized the receiver to place a super-priority lien against the property
for any code-related expenses incurred. Unlike those preexisting
approaches, however, the Baltimore version of receivership al-
77. BUILDING, FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALTIMORE CITY §121
(2013).
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lowed for an almost immediate foreclosure on that lien, if the own-
er or one of the affected mortgagees did not step forward and
commit to immediate elimination of the code violations.78  The
ordinance provided for a special auction process that required the
foreclosing receiver to ensure that all bidders were ready, willing,
and able to bring the property into full code compliance.7 9 Alt-
hough this pre-renovation sale remedy is far from universal, Ohio
and Indiana have also enacted similar vacant building receivership
provisions.80 As more jurisdictions see the benefit of being able to
"fire" an owner unwilling or incapable of renovating his or her
property, neighborhoods till strong enough to support renovations
of their vacant properties will have the legal means to achieve
them.
Comparing the truly distressed areas with stronger neigh-
borhoods, we see that vacant properties virtually identical in their
defects may have completely different futures depending on the
values of the occupied properties around them. Neighborhood
market strength so strongly determines the economic feasibility of
major repairs that even equally aggressive code enforcement in
each situation will not significantly improve the rehabilitation pro-
spects for the vacant house in the deteriorated neighborhood.
Those houses will not be fixed up one at a time. Rather, invest-
ment in them needs to be coordinated. For this reason, cities deal-
ing with large, concentrated inventories of vacant houses have
turned to land banking.
Land banking is nothing more than the large-scale acquisi-
tion of vacant properties for subsequent return to productive use.
Tax foreclosure of delinquent houses and lots allows for land as-
sembly and a bundled disposition process. Land banking strategies
can work in tandem with demolition of vacant houses to create
usable open space in severely undercrowded neighborhoods. New-
ly created vacant lots can be made available to neighboring home-
owners as side yards and to community greening groups as vegeta-
78. Id.; see James J. Kelly, Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant
Building Receivership as a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and Communi-
ty Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEv. L. 210, 217 (2004).
79. BUILDING, FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALTIMORE CITY § 121.
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41 (2015); IND. CODE §36-7-9-20
(2015).
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ble gardens and pocket parks. By gaining control and taking re-
sponsibility for vacant properties right now, land banks can set the
stage for a grounded move forward for communities contending
with decades of demographic decline. But, while land banking
may offer a viable future to the distressed neighborhood, it does so
on a much more extended timetable than the revitalization offered
to the healthier neighborhoods receiving targeted, aggressive code
enforcement.
One neighborhood receives immediate renovation of its
remaining vacant properties while another receives demolitions
and long-term plans for future revitalization. The Fair Housing
Act implications of the stark difference, at least in the short run,
between these governmental responses becomes more clear when
we recognize that the truly distressed neighborhoods, especially in
older cities in the Northeast and the Midwest, are overwhelmingly
occupied by African-Americans. On the other hand, the healthier
neighborhoods, even in cities with large African-American popula-
tions, tend to be a mix of majority-white and majority-black areas.
Rather than closing the gap between Racially Concentrated Areas
of Poverty and more viable neighborhoods, market-sensitive code
enforcement and land banking seem to be reinforcing and, possi-
bly, expanding it.
Scholars have argued about whether choices made to save
those neighborhoods that can be saved while letting others slip
away constitute "planned abandonment" of African-American
communities.8' While such academic discussions have continuing
81. In Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and
National Urban Policy, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 7 (2000), John Metzger
attacked Anthony Downs "[tiriage planning [as] the synthesis of the redlining
thesis and the postriot FHA [greenlining to promote neighborhood stability]
antithesis." Id. at 24. Metzger defined triage planning as the "target[ing of]
federal funds to neighborhoods where there was a moderate decline in property
values but not yet a clear downward trend of population loss, housing abandon-
ment, and increasing poverty." Id. at 17. For a response by Downs and others,
see Anthony Downs, Comment on John T. Metzger's "Planned Abandonment:
The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and National Urban Policy," 11 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 41 (2000); George C. Galster, Comment on John T. Metzger's
"Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and National
Urban Policy "(2), 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 61 (2000), and Kenneth Temkin,
"Comment on John T Metzger's "Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood
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relevance, jurisdictions depending on CDBG and other HUD funds
for their community development programs will certainly be more
focused on the recriminations that may come their way as part of
the AFH-required community comment process. As market-
sensitive vacant property strategies are facially race neutral, they
will be as safe from accusations of deliberate discrimination as
nearly all local government policies are. Code enforcement strate-
gies, however, that deliver immediate results in many white-
majority neighborhoods while offering only distant hope for poor,
black areas would seem to raise serious disparate impact issues.
But, the case outlined above for market-sensitive code enforcement
addresses not only justification but also causation. That is, the ar-
gument for not pursuing repair orders as aggressively in the dis-
tressed neighborhoods as in healthier blocks is not based on the
contention that the resulting renovations would not be enough to
significantly improve the more deteriorated communities. Rather,
the reality is that more aggressive prosecution of repair orders
would not produce any meaningful number of full-scale rehabilita-
tions at all. When it is known that diligent effort will produce only
failure, the decision not to even try cannot be said to be the cause
of the lack of success.
Nevertheless, it is true that targeting code enforcement re-
sources on the relatively few vacant properties in healthy neigh-
borhoods will not only keep those areas from becoming unable to
support individual, uncoordinated renovations but also set them on
a path to a decidedly brighter immediate future than the more dis-
tressed communities. To the extent that these resurgent neighbor-
hoods have smaller proportions of African-American residents,
these revitalization efforts will disproportionately benefit a city's
white residents. For this reason, it is vital that market-sensitive
code enforcement be accompanied by meaningful land banking
efforts so that the gap between a distressed neighborhood and a
healthy one can eventually be diminished rather than increased.
Substantive land banking efforts require publicly funded
resources. A city housing agency or a specially created land bank
authority has been given by the state legislature the ability to ob-
tain the right to foreclose on tax-delinquent vacant houses and lots
Life-Cycle Theory and National Urban Policy" (3), 11 HOUsING POL'Y DEBATE
55 (2000).
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without having to pay the full amount of taxes owed on the proper-
ties.82 Even so, there will be substantial costs in obtaining the nec-
essary information about the titles to these properties and notifying
the various stakeholders of their final chance to redeem their inter-
ests by paying off the tax debts completely. Once the property is
acquired, the land bank will need to spend money to minimize any
nuisances associated with the property and to market it for return
to productive use. City officials can hope that the sale or rental of
properties owned by the land bank might fund these activities, but
it is unlikely that land banks focusing on distressed neighborhoods
will be self-sustaining. If the value to be gained from assembling
dilapidated properties and bundling them for sale clearly produced
short-term gain, then there would be little need in the first place for
public intervention. Leading national experts call upon land bank-
ing advocates to argue for public funding for a land bank "by
showing that its activities provide a significant return to the local
treasury, either in the form of revenues from property sales or tax
revenues generated from properties being placed back in produc-
tive use."83
HUD acknowledges that AFFH cannot be used to mandate
specific spending priorities. Local governments engaged in mar-
ket-sensitive vacant property strategies retain the discretion as to
when, if at all, they pursue land banking in their distressed neigh-
borhoods. If, however, jurisdictions use CDBG funds to aggres-
sively pursue repair orders in viable neighborhood real estate mar-
kets and do nothing to stabilize the markets in more distressed
neighborhoods, then those jurisdictions will face great difficulties
in showing their overall approach to neighborhood revitalization
mitigates rather than aggravates racial segregation and the relative
lack of decent, affordable housing options for their residents of
color.
A local government's commitment to land banking may al-
low it to argue very persuasively in its AFH report that it has a
long-term plan to promote the viability of its racially concentrated
areas of poverty. But two aspects of land banking may alienate
members of the community anxious to see their neighborhood re-
82. Frank S. Alexander, Ctr. for Cmty. Progress, Land Banks and Land
Banking 76-77 (2011).
83. MALLACH, supra note 16, at 141.
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stored to its former vitality: the message of defeat communicated
by house demolition and the common land-banking practice of
selling properties in bundles rather than in single lots. The dangers
associated with long-term abandonment of vacant properties84 re-
quire that land banks seriously consider demolishing the houses
rather than continuously securing them against entry and the ele-
ments. Tearing down these houses sends a clear signal that reha-
bilitation of these and similar properties in the neighborhood is not
feasible. In February 2014, the Mayor of South Bend announced
that the City would transform 1,000 vacant houses in 1,000 days.
Even though the overwhelming majority of the properties were
located in severely distressed neighborhoods, the City was able to
renovate 378 of those properties while the rest were demolished.86
While some might see this as an unexpectedly positive result, some
of the owners of the demolished properties feel that they were de-
prived of the opportunity to fix up the houses they owned. Regina
Williams-Preston lost to demolition three such houses that she and
her husband had recently purchased after he unexpectedly fell ill. 87
They wanted to be part of a grassroots effort but were unable to
convince the City to give them the time they needed to complete
renovations. It is not clear whether the City's decisions were based
on the weakness of the neighborhood market or on the owners'
inability to bring the properties into code compliance right away or
some combination of both. What is clear is that Ms. Williams-
Preston, as a newly elected member of the South Bend Common
84. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
85. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK
FORCE REPORT 10 (2013), http://southbendin.gov/sites/default/files/files/Code
FinalVATF Report 2_red.pdf.
86. Erin Blasko, City Reaches its Vacant and Abandoned Housing Goal,
SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.southbendtribune.com/
news/local/south-bend-reaches-vacant-and-abandoned-housing-
goal/article_9ec592d9-efec-52e4-bled-45f892acl 8ae.html.
87. Erin Blasko, Candidate: House Issues Due to Illness, SOUTH BEND




2016 Affirmatively Furthering Neighborhood Choice
Council, wants to explore the racial justice issues raised by the
aggressive use of demolition orders in distressed neighborhoods.
Apart from its reliance on demolition, land banking can al-
so frustrate grassroots advocates of revitalization when it advocates
that vacant properties be sold in bundles rather than one at a time.
When repair orders on vacant houses were not aggressively pur-
sued because the neighborhood market was found to be too weak,
those responsible for disposing of these same vacant houses and
lots may be skeptical of a development proposal limited to just one
property. Land bank staff may determine that it is in the long-term
interest of the neighborhood to make sure the properties go to a
developer that can create or renovate several houses together and
achieve a return that would be unlikely in the case of a much
smaller change in the neighborhood. Such developers may have
significant resources and be relatively unknown to the long-time
members of the community. With both the demolition and bun-
dled disposition aspects of land banking work, local governments
committed to the long-term viability must work to involve mem-
bers of the community in these decisions or be prepared to face
widespread backlash after inviting community comments about the
fair housing aspects of their land banking efforts. Because the
challenges that the AFH process presents to a local government
taking innovative approaches to vacant properties arise from the
AFH community input component, it is critical that land banks not
only practice social equity but also communicate with and involve
those most affected by their work.
Even success in land banking can raise racial justice con-
cerns. Once a distressed neighborhood has gained traction with
people shopping for places to live, the history and lore of gentrifi-
cation recast residents from their previous roles as disregarded per-
sons into their new identities as potentially displaced persons. Af-
ter decades of enduring urban renewal and revitalization efforts,
inner-city residents of color have come to believe that if the neigh-
borhood they live in is being improved by money from outside the
community, then the intention is to improve it for someone other
than them. As a form of urban revitalization that seeks to reestab-
88. District 2: Regina Williams-Preston, CITY OF SOUTH BEND, INDIANA,
https://www.southbendin.gov/government/content/district-2-regina-williams-
preston (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
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lish market activity in distressed neighborhoods, land banks do in
fact seek to make these communities attractive to households that
have an array of choices of where they can live. Achieving these
goals can raise property taxes and rents for residents and small
businesses in the community. Since land banks bring potential
sites for decent, affordable homes into government ownership, it is
entirely reasonable for housing advocates to insist that all, or at
least some, of those properties be dedicated to the needs of low-
and moderate-income residents. The Community Land Trust
("CLT") model has been put forward as an ideal solution especial-
ly in cities such as Philadelphia and Baltimore, where large-scale
abandonment exists ide-by-side with very exclusive residential
development.89 Community Land Trusts are democratically con-
trolled, nonprofit organizations dedicated to holding land for the
benefit of local communities.90 They typically focus on creating
and stewarding permanently affordable owner-occupied homes.9 1
The legal mechanisms they use to allow homes to be affordable not
only to the original owners but also to future owners as well are
uniquely effective with single-family homes.92 Advocates of equi-
table development have argued that it is never too soon to plan for
high land values and the attendant lack of affordable housing.9 3
While a CLT can play a key role in insuring that a reinvigorated
real estate market does not drive out the very people who revital-
ized the community, other measures may also further the goal of
89. Jill Feldstein, Winning a Land Bank We Can Trust, SHELTERFORCE
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.shelterforce.org/article/3910/winning-a land bank_
wecantrust2/; BALTIMORE HOUSING ROUNDTABLE, COMMUNITY + LAND +
TRUST: TOOLS FOR DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DISPLACEMENT 24-35 (2015),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/unitedworkers/pages/239/attachments/or
iginal/1453986068/CL_Tweb.pdf?1453986068.
90. James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 79-81 (2009).
91. Id. at 82.
92. James J. Kelly, Jr. Homes Affordable for Good: Covenants and
Ground Leases as Long-Term Resale Restriction Devices, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 9, 38 (2009).
93. SHELTERFORCE, THE ANSWER: WHAT'S THE POINT OF SHARED-
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community conservation.9 4 Long-time homeowners, especially the
elderly, or others living of fixed incomes, may be pressured to sell
if rising land values in their neighborhood dramatically increase
their property tax burdens.9 5 Broad or targeted protections against
such increases may promote the socioeconomic diversity in an in-
creasingly attractive neighborhood that can be a core goal of an
AFFH strategy.9 6
Whether responding to charges of redlining or making the
case for their own AFFH efforts, local governments involved in
land banking not only need to get those reading their AFH reports
to think in the long term, they must do so themselves. Land banks
cannot be just an excuse for not deploying more code enforcement
resources to a distressed neighborhood. There must be a long-haul
commitment not only to mitigating vacant property nuisances here
and now but also reconnecting these communities to the good, ser-
vices and housing consumers of the metropolitan area. Until this
point, this Article has looked at the AFH as a challenge for any
community wishing to justify market-sensitive vacant property
strategies. But this mechanism for fair housing accountability can
also deliver real benefits to cities struggling to get their land bank-
ing activities underway.
As noted above,9 7 land banks depend largely on tax fore-
closure to acquire clear title to the hundreds and thousands of va-
cant houses and lots in their designated territories. In most states,
property tax collection processes are controlled by county govern-
ments. Municipal land banks that wish to acquire vacant proper-
ties through tax foreclosure often need to go "hat in hand" asking
the county for the ability to acquire those vacant properties without
having to pay the full balance of the outstanding liens. Sometimes,
tax foreclosure reforms enacted at the state level, often as part of
push to implement land banking, will give the cities the ability to
purchase the tax liens at or below the actual value of the property
rather than at the, often much higher, total amount of the public
liens on the abandoned property.
94. James J. Kelly, Jr., Sustaining Neighborhoods of Choice: From Land
Bank(ing) to Land Trust(ing), 54 WASHBURN L. J. 613, 621-22 (2015)
95. Id. at 623.
96. Id. at 622-24.
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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In slow-growth regions with entitlement jurisdictions cities,
the surrounding counties themselves not only receive but depend
upon Community Development Block Grant funds for their own
economic development and neighborhood stabilization work.
Their obligation to deal with regional fair housing issues in their
AFFH reporting can be an opportunity for cities to exert pressure
on them to collaborate in stabilizing inner-city neighborhoods
through tax foreclosure reforms that allow land banks to acquire
clear title over vacant properties. But, these reforms are far from
universal and, where they are lacking, cities remain beholden to
counties in their efforts to reconnect distressed neighborhood va-
cant properties to a functioning real estate market.
As already described,98 HUD cannot use AFFH to invali-
date a policy or practice that is not itself prohibited by law. But,
when a county government refuses to release liens or lower the
minimum tax sale bid on a vacant property in a city and has no
valid reason for doing so, the consequences of that decision for the
city's AFFH efforts to create a community with sustainable socio-
economic diversity makes the county's refusal an AFFH issue.
Even if the county and the city do not submit a joint AFH, the
community input process may allow for several ways for the coun-
ty to be confronted with its obstruction of revitalization efforts
within the municipal boundaries.
98. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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